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OPTIMAL REDISTRIBUTIVE TAX AND EDUCATION 




Should a redistributive government optimally subsidize education to provoke a reduction in 
the skill premium through general equilibrium effects on wages? To answer this question, this 
paper studies optimal linear and non-linear redistributive income taxes and education 
subsidies in two-type models with endogenous human capital formation, endogenous labor 
supply, and endogenous wage rates. Under optimal linear policies, education should not be 
subsidized so as to reduce the skill premium. Linear income taxes are distributionally 
equivalent to (negative) linear education subsidies, but linear taxes do not distort investment 
in human capital, whether general equilibrium effects are present or not. If skilled labor 
supply is more elastic than unskilled labor supply, optimal redistributive linear income taxes 
are lowered as the distributional gains of linear taxes are offset by a rise in the skill premium. 
Moreover, the optimal linear income tax may even become negative if general equilibrium 
effects are sufficiently strong. Under non-linear taxation, governments can directly steer the 
skill premium by exploiting non-linearities in the policy schedules. At the top, the optimal 
marginal income tax rate is negative, and the optimal marginal education subsidy is positive. 
At the bottom, the optimal marginal income tax rate is positive, and education is optimally 
taxed at the margin. Hence, optimal non-linear tax and education policies compress wage 
differentials, which contributes to redistribution. Simulations show that the top rate and 
marginal education subsidies are close to zero for a wide range of plausible parameters. Only 
when high-ability and low-ability workers are rather poor substitutes in production, marginal 
education subsidies on the high type and marginal education taxes on the low type 
substantially differ from zero. 
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Economics Area Conference, Munich, April 20-22, 2007. “Educational policies deserve to be programmed not only with a view to im-
proving education in the widest sense, but also in order to inﬂuence the income
distribution”, Tinbergen (1975, p.148).
1 Introduction
In his book Income Distribution, the Dutch Nobel-prize winner Jan Tinbergen (1975) extensively
discusses the merits of increasing the supply of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers to
reduce wage inequality. As the relative supply of skilled workers falls, the skill premium is
lowered, and wage inequality diminishes. Tinbergen’s concern with growing inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers is more relevant today than it was in the 1970s. Many Western
countries are currently confronted with sharply increasing skill premiums. Skill-biased techno-
logical change causes the demand for skilled workers to increase more rapidly than the supply of
unskilled workers (Katz and Autor, 1999). In Tinbergen’s (1975) terminology: the race between
education and technological change is currently lost by education. Also, globalization may jeop-
ardize the prospects for low-skilled workers. In light of the deteriorating labor market position
of low-skilled workers it is not surprising that subsidies to foster skill formation have a strong
policy appeal. By boosting human capital formation, equality may be served because general
equilibrium eﬀects on wages reduce the skill premium. As there is less pre-tax inequality, the
need to redistribute incomes through distorting income taxes may diminish at the same time.
The main question of this paper is: should general equilibrium eﬀects on the wage distribution be
exploited in an optimal redistributive tax cum education system? To answer this question, this
paper analyzes optimal redistributive tax and education policies in a Mirrlees (1971) framework.
Due to imperfect substitution between diﬀerent skill types in labor demand, the skill premium is
determined by both demand and supply conditions in the labor market. Furthermore, skill levels
are endogenously determined by human capital investments, and not exogenous as in Mirrlees
(1971).
This analysis closely follows Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). These authors derive, in a partial
equilibrium framework, that human capital formation should neither be taxed nor subsidized (on
a net basis) in an optimal redistributive program with linear or non-linear taxes and subsidies.
The intuition is as follows. One the one hand, subsidies on education are implicit subsidies on
work eﬀort, since working and learning are complementary in generating income. On the other
hand, education subsidies are regressive, since high-ability individuals invest more in human
capital (the ‘ability bias’). With the earnings functions used by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005),
both eﬀects cancel out exactly, and the sole role of education subsidies is to oﬀset the distortions
of the income tax on skill formation (see also Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2007).
This paper maintains the assumptions of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) to ensure that hu-
man capital is optimally not subsidized in the absence of general equilibrium eﬀects on wages.
Therefore, the earnings function is assumed to be weakly separable between ability, labor, and
education, both with linear and non-linear policies. Additionally, the production function for
human capital is assumed to have a constant elasticity if linear policies are considered, see also
Jacobs and Bovenberg (2007). Individuals also have an iso-elastic utility function, so that la-
bor supply elasticities are constant, and income eﬀects are absent. This simple utility function
highlights the crucial role of human capital supply elasticities under linear policy instruments.
Finally, the analysis is restricted to two types of agents that diﬀer in their ability to acquire
human capital. We refer to the high-ability type as the ‘skilled’ and the low-ability type as the
‘unskilled’ agent.1
1Strictly speaking, skills are endogenous, and not an innate trait of individuals. Therefore, referring to the
high-(low-)ability type as being ‘skilled’ (‘unskilled’) is an abuse of language for expositional reasons.
2Whether education policy should optimally be employed to provoke redistributive general
equilibrium eﬀects on the skill premium is shown to depend crucially on two things. First, can
education policy aﬀect the relative supply of human capital in such a way that the skill premium
falls? The skill premium will be a downward sloping function of the relative supplies of human
capital: π (H1/H2), π0 < 0. Hence, education subsidies must increase the relative supply H1/H2
to be helpful in reducing wage inequality. Second, if education subsidies do indeed increase
relative supply of human capital, should education subsidies, when optimally combined with
an income tax, also be used? The answers to both questions are not obvious, and they diﬀer
fundamentally for linear and non-linear policy instruments.
The ﬁrst part of this paper considers optimal linear tax and education subsidies. Linear
education subsidies tend to increase both H1 and H2 at the same time, and it is not clear
whether relative supply of human capital is increased at all. The supply of human capital of
each agent depends on ability a, education e, and labor eﬀort, i.e., H1(a1,e1,l1) and H2(a2,e2,l2),
where the ﬁrst agent has high ability, and the second low ability.2 It is demonstrated that general
equilibrium eﬀects can never be exploited for redistributional reasons when supply elasticities
of both labor and education are equal across agents, and income eﬀects are absent. The reason
is that relative human capital supply (H1/H2) remains ﬁxed. Indeed, linear education subsidies
(s) will only compress wage diﬀerentials if the skilled worker’s supply of human capital is more
elastic with respect to the subsidy than the unskilled worker’s supply of human capital. As
agents are assumed to have human capital production functions with a constant elasticity (under
linear instruments only), the labor supply elasticity of the skilled worker has to be higher than
that of the unskilled worker for education subsidies to have the potential to compress the wage
distribution.
The second question is: if the skilled worker has a higher labor supply elasticity, and education
subsidies therefore can reduce the skill premium, should education subsidies also be employed
in an optimal redistributive program alongside optimal linear taxes? With linear policies, the
answer to this question is no. A linear education subsidy is distributionally equivalent to a linear
income tax, even if there are general equilibrium eﬀects on wages. The reason is that gross
income is linear in education as a result of the constant elasticity of the production function for
human capital. Hence, it is not optimal to exploit general equilibrium eﬀects with the education
subsidy, because the income tax can do this equally well, while avoiding excessive investment
in human capital. Therefore, the eﬃciency results of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) derived in
partial equilibrium carry over to the general equilibrium case.
In contrast, the optimal linear income tax is importantly aﬀected by general equilibrium
eﬀects on wages. The assumption that skilled workers have a higher labor supply elasticity than
unskilled workers implies that higher income taxes will reduce labor supply of the skilled workers
relatively more than that of unskilled workers. Linear income taxation thus increases the skill
premium, and before-tax income inequality increases. Consequently, general equilibrium eﬀects
on wages run against the distributional beneﬁts of a higher income tax, and optimal income taxes
are lowered as a result. Theoretically, the optimal linear income tax may even turn negative if
the indirect general equilibrium eﬀects on the pre-tax wage distribution are strong enough to
oﬀset the direct eﬀects of higher marginal tax rates on the post-tax wage distribution.
The second part of the paper considers the simultaneous setting of optimal non-linear tax
and education policies. Optimal non-linear policies diﬀer fundamentally from linear policies
when general equilibrium eﬀects on wages are present. The key to understanding why they
diﬀer is that the relative supply of human capital (H1/H2) can, by deﬁnition, be directly steered
by the non-linear tax and education schedules – even if all supply elasticities are equal. By
2To avoid confusion, Hn is referred to as the supply of ‘broad human capital’, encompassing both quality
(education) and quantity (labor) dimensions of labor. When we speak of ‘investment in human capital’, i.e.,
education, this only applies to the ‘narrow’ deﬁnition of human capital, i.e., the augmentation of labor time.
3giving a marginal education subsidy on the high type, and a marginal education tax on the low
type, the government can directly increase the relative supply of skilled human capital to lower
the skill premium. Therefore, the ﬁrst question – can education policy aﬀect the relative supply
of education in such a way that the skill premium falls? – can be answered aﬃrmatively.
The second question is: should education subsidies be optimally employed in an optimal
redistributive program? The answer with non-linear policies is yes. The skilled worker faces a
marginal subsidy on education, while the unskilled worker faces a marginal tax on education.
The optimal marginal income tax on the skilled worker is negative, while the optimal marginal
tax on the unskilled worker is positive, as in Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). We demonstrate
that marginal education taxes/subsidies are directly linked to the top rate: marginal subsidies
are zero when the top rate is zero. As the skilled worker faces a positive subsidy on both labor
eﬀort and education, and the unskilled worker faces a positive tax on both education and labor
eﬀort, the skill premium will be reduced. A skilled worker will be less tempted to mimic an
unskilled worker, incentive compatibility constraints will be relaxed, and the government can
redistribute more income. In contrast to the linear policies, non-linear instruments do exploit
general equilibrium eﬀects for redistribution.
We analyze the quantitative importance of general equilibrium eﬀects by simulating optimal
non-linear income taxes and education subsidies. We ﬁnd that the marginal top rate is negative,
and rather small for plausible elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor,
which conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Stern (1982). Optimal education subsidies are not large either,
since there is a direct link between the top rate and education subsidies. However, we demon-
strate quantitatively that general equilibrium should particularly be exploited for redistribution
when the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is low.
Tinbergen’s suggestion to promote skill formation so as to provoke a decline in the skill
premium for redistributional reasons is possible only under non-linear policies. The case is
lost under linear tax instruments. Intuitively, the generic linear education subsidy is an inef-
ﬁcient instrument to reduce the skill premium, because it increases human capital supply of
all agents simultaneously. Non-linear education subsidies avoid this simultaneous increase in
human capital supplies and can be tailored to increase supply of the high-ability types, while
simultaneously lowering the supply of the low-ability types. However, numerical simulations of
non-linear policies give rather weak support to the use of education policies in reducing inequal-
ity through general equilibrium eﬀects on wages. Hence, it appears that direct instruments are
more eﬃcient than indirect instruments, i.e. education subsidies.3
This paper is related to a number of other papers. First, Dur and Teulings (2001, 2004)
pioneered the analysis of optimal tax and education policies in the presence of general equilibrium
eﬀects on wages. They developed a log-linear matching model with a continuum of agents. These
authors show that education is subsidized in an optimal redistributive tax and education policy
as long as the regressive incidence of the education subsidy (ability bias) does not oﬀset the
progressive general equilibrium eﬀect on wages. Education policy then allows the government
to rely less on distortionary income taxation for redistribution. This paper provides diﬀerent
results, and the reasons for this are twofold. First, Dur and Teulings (2001, 2003) only analyze
log-linear policies. Log-linear education policies have the property that high-ability types receive
a higher marginal subsidy on education than low-ability types. Thus, the regressive schedule for
education subsidies directly reduces the skill premium, as high-ability types will invest relatively
more in human capital than low-ability types. Second, the authors assume that increase in the
3From an empirical point of view, evidence is not particularly abundant either. Heckman et al. (1998) show in
a dynamic overlapping generations model of skill formation for the US economy that long-run income inequality
can hardly be changed through education policy. They show that after an initial positive impact of education
subsidies on the relative supply of skilled labor, and thereby a reduction in the skill premium, the incentives to
acquire human capital diminish, and the initial increase in relative supply of skilled workers is almost completely
reversed in the long run.
4mean level of human capital always reduces the skill premium, even if all behavioral elasticities
are equal and income eﬀects in labor supply are absent, so that relative supplies of human
capital remain ﬁxed. This contrasts with the current paper, where an increase in the mean level
of human capital, while not changing the relative supplies of human capital, does not aﬀect the
wage distribution.
Second, some papers analyzed the question whether direct or indirect instruments should
be used for redistribution in general equilibrium settings. If the government cannot observe
diﬀerent skill-types in production, and cannot tax or subsidize all production inputs at diﬀerent
rates, both the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) production eﬃciency theorem, and the Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976) zero commodity tax theorem break down. Indirect taxes should therefore
optimally complement the non-linear income tax, even when preferences are weakly separable
(Naito, 1999). Saez (2004), in contrast, argues against indirect instruments for redistribution,
and restores the validity of the production eﬃciency and zero commodity tax theorems when
skill-types are imperfect substitutes in production. Naito (2004, 2007) ﬁnds that this holds true
only if more able individuals do not have a comparative advantage in high-skilled occupations. By
allowing for comparative advantage in skill formation, Naito (2004, 2007) derives that deviations
from aggregate production eﬃciency, and non-zero commodity taxation are optimal.
This paper contributes to this literature and ﬁnds that another powerful property of optimal
tax structures is violated under linear and non-linear taxation. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)
derive that optimal tax expressions are the same in partial equilibrium (ﬁxed prices), and general
equilibrium (variable prices). This is what Saez (2004) calls the ‘tax formula result’. We show
that labor demand parameters explicitly enter optimal tax formulae, and factor price changes
are exploited for redistribution. Hence, the tax formula result also breaks down with compara-
tive advantage in skill formation, as in Feldstein (1973), Allen (1982), Stern (1982), and Stiglitz
(1982). Moreover, indirect instruments, such as education subsidies, should optimally comple-
ment the non-linear income tax. Hence, under non-linear income taxation, the zero commodity
tax theorem is not applicable to education, which further bolsters the ﬁndings by Naito (1999,
2004, 2007).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the model with
optimal linear income taxation and education policies in general equilibrium. Section 3 studies
the same problem using non-linear instruments. Section 4 concludes. An appendix contains all
the technical derivations.
2 Model
This section presents the base-line model. The standard models of optimal income taxation with
general equilibrium eﬀects on wages are extended with human capital formation.4 Individuals
diﬀer in their capacity to accumulate human capital and earnings capacities of individuals are
endogenous rather than exogenously given. Furthermore, individuals with higher ability have
a comparative advantage in skill formation. A ‘one-shot’ model of human capital investments
is analyzed. One may view this model as describing life-time investments in human capital,
life-time labor supply and life-time consumption, where there are no inter-temporal distortions
due to capital taxes or capital market failures, for example.5 To fully track down the general
equilibrium impact of tax and education policies analytically, the analysis is restricted to two
types, as in almost the entire literature.6
4See, for example, Feldstein (1973), Allen (1982), Stern (1982), and Stiglitz (1982).
5The importance of liquidity constraints for human capital formation is increasingly disputed on empirical
grounds by, for example, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) or Cameron and Taber (2004).
6Saez (2004) and Dur and Teulings allow (2001, 2004) for an inﬁnite number of skill types.
52.1 Individuals
There is a unit mass of high-ability and low-ability workers who are indexed by n = 1 and n = 2,
respectively. The fraction of high-ability workers is g1 and the fraction of low-ability workers is
g2.
Each worker has an iso-elastic utility function u(cn,ln) which is deﬁned over consumption cn
and work eﬀort ln according to





, n = 1,2, (1)
where εn > 0 is the (un)compensated wage elasticity of labor supply of individual n. Since income
eﬀects are absent, compensated and uncompensated elasticities coincide, and labor supply is
always upward sloping. This utility function is also used for its analytical simplicity in Diamond
(1998), Saez (2001), Dur and Teulings (2001), and Naito (2004). This speciﬁcation of utility is
suﬃciently general to stress the main points at stake, while not introducing additional analytical
complexity due to income eﬀects, as in Allen (1982). Moreover, it highlights the crucial role of
diﬀerent labor supply elasticities under linear policy instruments. Indeed, elasticities of labor
supply are assumed to diﬀer, and ε1 is not equal to ε2. In the absence of income eﬀects,
diﬀerent elasticities of labor supply or human capital formation are necessary to obtain general
equilibrium eﬀects of policy. As human capital elasticities are assumed to be equal, see below,
linear policy instruments would have no general equilibrium eﬀects if labor supply elasticities
would be identical.
Human capital is accumulated on the intensive margin. Individuals invest en of their resources
in education. One can think of en as the years enrolled in education or the quality of education
where each individual has access to the same educational inputs, but transforms them diﬀerently
into human capital depending on their ability. Gross labor income zn of each individual is
zn ≡ wnanφ(en)ln, n = 1,2, (2)
where φ0(en) > 0 and φ00(en) < 0. wn denotes the gross wage rate per unit of human capital of an
individual of skill-type n, and, ln is work eﬀort. anφn(en) is the production function for human
capital, where an is the exogenous productivity of investment in human capital. a1 > a2, i.e.,
high-ability types have a comparative advantage in learning. High-ability types generate more
human capital with the same amount of educational eﬀorts because ∂zn
∂en∂an = wnφ0(en)ln > 0.7 To
ensure that optimal education subsidies are zero in the absence of general equilibrium eﬀects, the
earnings function is weakly separable in ability, education, and labor (Jacobs and Bovenberg,
2007). The elasticity of the production function is also assumed to be constant under linear
policies, and is denoted by β ≡
φ0(en)en
φ(en) (see Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2007). In general equilibrium,
type 1 is assumed to earn a higher gross income than type 2, i.e. w1a1φ(e1)l1 > w2a1φ(e2)l2.
The price of one unit of education is denoted by pn. Note that these costs might diﬀer between
individuals. All costs are assumed to be tax deductible since the major costs of education consist
of taxed opportunity costs.8 Investments in education en are subsidized at ﬂat rate s. Gross
incomes zn are taxed at a constant marginal rate t. In addition, every individual may receive a
non-individualized lump-sum transfer b. Hence, the income tax is progressive in the sense that
7This form of comparative advantage is suﬃciently rich to describe the main results of this paper. We may,
however, allow the two types to accumulate both types of human capital, where the high-ability type is more
productive in skilled human capital accumulation than the low-ability type. This will not qualitatively aﬀect
our main results. Naito (2004) also shows that his results in the more general speciﬁcation carry over to the
restricted speciﬁcation.
8One may, additionally, introduce untaxed direct costs, like tuition fees, but this slightly complicates the
analysis without aﬀecting our main results as long as all costs of education can be veriﬁed, and, therefore,
subsidized, see also Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).
6average tax rates increase with income. The fundamental informational requirements to levy a
linear income tax, and to provide linear education subsidies are that aggregate gross incomes
and aggregate investment in human capital must be veriﬁable by the government.
Consumption cn equals total net labor income minus education expenditures:
cn = (1 − t)(wnanφ(en)ln − (1 − s)pnen) + b, n = 1,2. (3)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for utility maximization yield the following constant elasticity labor
supply functions for each individual
ln = ((1 − t)wnanφ(en))
εn , n = 1,2. (4)
Labor supply ln increases with the net marginal wage rate and taxes depress labor supply. The
ﬁrst-order condition for optimal human capital investment is given by
wnanφ
0(en)ln = (1 − s)pn, n = 1,2. (5)
Marginal beneﬁts of learning (the left-hand side) should be equal to the marginal costs of learning
(the right-hand side). Subsidies increase investment in human capital. Taxes have no direct eﬀect
on learning because both marginal costs and marginal beneﬁts are equally aﬀected. Taxation
does, however, reduce labor supply and lowers the returns of investments in human capital
indirectly.
First-order conditions are necessary, but not suﬃcient. The ﬁrst-order conditions reveal that
investments in education increase if larger labor supply increases the utilization rate of human
capital. As investments in human capital increase, net wage rates per hour worked increase,
and labor supply expands. Larger labor supply, in turn, results in higher investment in human
capital, and so on. Suﬃciently strong diminishing returns to human capital accumulation β, or a
suﬃciently low wage elasticity of labor supply εn, should guarantee that this feedback dampens,
so that an interior solution in human capital formation and labor supply is attained. Second-
order conditions are satisﬁed by imposing the following restriction on the parameters (see the
Appendix for the derivation)
µn ≡ 1 − β(1 + εn) > 0, n = 1,2. (6)












µn are important determinants of the optimal tax rates, and are derived in the Appendix. The





elasticity of gross income εn
µn exceeds the wage elasticity of gross income εn. The reason is
that the tax rate t reduces the after-tax wage (1 − t)wnanφ(en) both directly (by raising the
tax wedge between the before-tax wage and the after-tax wage t) and indirectly (by depressing
the before-tax wage rate wnanφ(en) through its negative impact on learning en). Learning is
harmed indirectly because lower labor supply depresses the utilization rate of human capital.




















There is one sector of production.9 A representative ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts while taking wage
rates w1 and w2 for each skill type as given. The ﬁrm produces output Y with a neoclassical
9At least two production sectors producing diﬀerent commodities, where one sector is intensive in skilled
labor and the other in unskilled labor, are necessary to analyze the desirability of aggregate production eﬃciency
and the optimality of zero commodity taxation, see Naito (1999, 2004, 2007). This extension is left for future
research.
7production function, which features constant returns to scale in labor inputs H1 and H2
Y ≡ F(H1,H2), (7)
where Fn(.) > 0, Fnn(.) < 0, F12 ≥ 0, n = 1,2, and subscript n refers to the n-th argument





w1H1+w2H2 is, therefore, the income share of the high-income earner. Further, if α < 1/2,
the low-ability type earns less than the high-ability type. σ ≡
F1(.)F2(.)
F12(.)F(.) denotes the partial
elasticity of substitution between H1 and H2 in the production function F(.).
First-order conditions for proﬁt maximization are necessary and suﬃcient, and given by
wn = Fn(H1,H2), n = 1,2. (8)
The skill premium π is the ratio of wages of skilled and unskilled workers, i.e., π ≡ w1/w2.
With constant returns to scale in production, π is only a function of the relative supplies of






f (H1/H2) − (H1/H2)f0 (H1/H2)
, (9)
where π0 (H1/H2) < 0. The skill premium decreases if the relative supply of skilled workers,
H1/H2, increases.
Note that if both types have the same labor supply elasticity εn, all the tax and subsidy elas-
ticities will be equal across individuals (see previous section). Hence, linear policy instruments
cannot aﬀect the skill premium π in that case.
2.3 General equilibrium
Labor market clearing requires that supply equals demand for each labor type:
Hn = anφ(en)lngn, n = 1,2. (10)
Further, goods market equilibrium requires that total output equals total consumption, plus
investments in human capital, plus exogenously given government expenditures Λ:
F(H1,H2) = (c1 + p1e1)g1 + (c2 + p2e2)g2 + Λ. (11)
2.4 Government
The government maximizes a social welfare function over indirect utilities vn(b,t,s,wn):
ω1v1(b,t,s,w1)g1 + ω2v2v2(b,t,s,w2)g2, ωn ≥ 0, n = 1,2, (12)
where ωn denotes the weight of type n in social welfare. The welfare weights sum to one: ω1+ω2 =
1. If ω1 = ω2, the social welfare function is utilitarian, and there is no social preference for
redistribution due to the constancy of marginal utility of income at the individual level (no
income eﬀects). ω2 > ω1 implies a social preference for redistribution.10
The government collects taxes to ﬁnance the lump-sum transfer, the education subsidies, and
the exogenous revenue requirement Λ. The government budget constraint reads as
t(w1a1φ(e1)l1 − (1 − s)p1e1)g1 + t(w2a2φ(e2)l2 − (1 − s)p2e2)g2 (13)
= sp1e1g1 + sp2e2g2 + b + Λ.
10Without loss of generality social welfare weights are kept constant, but these may be derived from a concave
function over private utilities.
8The government maximizes social welfare by optimally choosing the lump-sum transfer b,




L = ω1v1(b,t,s,w1)g1 + ω2v2(b,t,s,w2)g2 (14)
+η (t(w1a1φ(e1)l1 − (1 − s)p1e1)g1 + t(w2a2φ(e2)l2 − (1 − s)p2e2)g2)
−η (sp1e1g1 + sp2e2g2 + b + Λ),
where η denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint, and the labor
market clearing conditions have to be imposed w1 = F1 (H1,H2), w2 = F2 (H1,H2), and Hn =
anφ(en)ln, n = 1,2.






g2 = 1, (15)
where we used Roy’s lemma (∂vn
∂b = 1), and ωn
η is the social marginal utility of income of type n.
The average social marginal beneﬁts of a higher b (i.e., the left-hand side of (15)) should equal
the costs in terms of a higher b (i.e., the right-hand side of (15)).
With the aid of the ﬁrst-order condition for b (15), the distributional characteristic ξz of
labor income is deﬁned as (minus) the normalized covariance between the social marginal utility
of income ωn


























where the second equality follows from (15). With a positive distributional characteristic ξz,
taxing labor income yields distributional beneﬁts, because the high-ability worker has a lower




η , and earns a higher income, z1 > z2.
Indeed, a zero distributional characteristic implies either that the government is utilitarian (ω2 =
ω1), and not interested in redistribution, or that the marginal contribution to the tax base is
equal for both ability types (i.e., taxable income zn is the same for both types).



























A positive distributional characteristic implies that subsidizing (taxing) education results in dis-
tributional losses (gains). If education levels are equal for both workers, there is no educational
inequality, and subsidizing education yields no distributional losses. The absence of a redis-
tributional motive renders the distributional characteristic zero. Note that the distributional
characteristic of education is equal to the distributional characteristic of income, because gross
earnings are linear in education due to the constant elasticity of the production function for
human capital. This assumption ensures that (negative) education subsidies are distribution-
ally equivalent to income taxes, see also Jacobs and Bovenberg (2007). In the remainder, the
superscripts are dropped, and ξ ≡ ξz = ξe.
11Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that there is no guarantee that the second-order conditions for the gov-
ernment’s maximization problem are automatically satisﬁed. We assume, however, that the ﬁrst-order conditions
are indeed suﬃcient to characterize the optimal solution.
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Roy’s lemma has been used in deriving both expressions, i.e., ∂vn
∂t = −(wnanφ(en)ln − (1 − s)pnen),
and ∂vn
∂s = (1 − t)pnen, and ∂vn
∂wn = (1 − t)anφ(en)ln.
2.5 Optimal tax policies in general equilibrium
This section ﬁrst derives the case in which education subsidies are not used (s = 0). Furthermore,
it starts with deriving the optimal linear income tax in the absence of general equilibrium eﬀects
(see, e.g., Sheshinski, 1971; Dixit and Sandmo, 1977; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). In that case,
the last two lines in the ﬁrst-order condition for t (18) are zero, and the optimal linear income













where ¯ εlt ≡ (1 − α)εlt
1 + αεlt
2, and ¯ εlt/(1 − β) = ¯ εzt is the income weighted average of the
tax elasticity of total labor earnings. The denominator is the elasticity of the tax base with
respect to the tax rate. The optimal income tax formula (20) shows the trade-oﬀ between equity
(numerator) and eﬃciency (denominator). The larger the social preference for redistribution
is, the larger is ξ, and, the higher is the optimal marginal income tax. If both groups have an
equal weight in social welfare (ω2 = ω1) the optimal marginal income tax is zero, because ξ = 0.
The larger the income weighted average elasticity of labor earnings is, the lower is the optimal
linear income tax, because the labor income tax more heavily distorts labor supply. Both the
elasticities of labor supply and human capital formation determine the eﬀective elasticity of
earnings, which is due to the feedback between labor supply and human capital formation. See
also Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) for a more elaborate discussion.
With general equilibrium eﬀects, in contrast, the last two lines in the ﬁrst-order condition
for t (18) are not zero, and need to be taken into account as well. To obtain a general expression
10for the optimal linear income tax with general equilibrium eﬀects on wages, the property is
exploited that inverse labor demand equations are homogeneous of degree zero as long as there









































The expression for the optimal linear income tax in partial equilibrium diﬀers from the expres-
sion for the optimal income tax in general equilibrium. Hence, the ‘tax-formula result’ does not
apply (see also Saez, 2004). The diﬀerence with formula without general equilibrium eﬀects is














the distributional losses (or gains) arising from general equilibrium eﬀects on wages, and are sub-
tracted from the direct welfare gains of higher income taxes in reducing inequality (as measured
by ξ). The optimal marginal linear income tax is lower with general equilibrium eﬀects than
without if: i) substitution between labor types is ﬁnite (σ < ∞), ii) the (uncompensated) earn-







The eﬀects of imperfect substitution in labor types have been subject of most of the papers
in this ﬁeld, so these results do not come as a surprise. If labor types are perfect substitutes
(σ = ∞), the last term in the expression of the optimal income tax (23) vanishes. In this case,
wage rates per hour worked are not aﬀected by changes in relative factor supplies, and the wage
distribution is exogenous.
The second condition, on the relative sizes of labor supply elasticities, has received no at-
tention so far. The formula demonstrates that general equilibrium eﬀects only contribute to
more equality if high-skilled labor earnings respond less elastically to an increase in taxes than






µ2). In that case, higher taxes raise relative supply
of skilled labor (H1/H2), the skill premium π (H1/H2) declines, see (9), and larger inequality







µ2), general equilibrium eﬀects work against redistribution of incomes
through income taxes by increasing before-tax income inequality as the relative supply of skilled
labor declines. Below we derive that a higher elasticity of skilled labor supply is a necessary
requirement for education subsidies to work in favor of redistribution via general equilibrium ef-
fects under linear policy instruments. Hence, we assume that εzt
1 > εzt
2 , or, equivalently, ε1 > ε2.
Also from an empirical point of view, a larger elasticity of skilled labor relative to unskilled la-
bor is plausible (see Gruber and Saez, 2003). Furthermore, it can be demonstrated that, if both
workers have identical CES utility functions, uncompensated wage elasticities of labor supply
unambiguously increase with skill type as long as labor supply functions are upward sloping.12
12Suppose we hold human capital accumulation ﬁxed. If utility has the CES form u(cn,ln) ≡
[δcρ
n + (1 − δ)(1 − ln)ρ]







ln/(1−ln)+ζ, where σcl ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure,
and ζ ≡ (1 − t)wnln/((1 − t)wnln + b) is the share of labor income in total income. The labor supply curve is
upward sloping (backward bending) if σcl > ζ (σcl < ζ). With identical tax rates t and transfers g, the uncom-
pensated tax elasticity of labor supply for high-skilled workers is higher than for low-skilled workers, if the labor











(ζ+ln/(1−ln))2 > 0 if σcl > ζ.
∂ζ
∂n > 0 as the uniform lump-sum transfer
11If the compensated elasticities of eﬀective total labor supply εzt
1 and εzt







µ2), the general equilibrium term vanishes as well. The intuition is straightforward.
With equal elasticities, linear taxation does not aﬀect relative labor supply. If relative total
labor supply (H1/H2) remains constant, relative wages (w1/w2) remain constant as well, cf. the
skill premium (9). This is the case, for example, if all individuals have identical preferences
(ε1 = ε2). Hence, this example illustrates the necessity of heterogeneous preferences (in the
absence of income eﬀects) for our model to make sense in a general equilibrium context.13
The expression for the optimal income tax (23) suggests that optimal marginal income taxes
may even become negative. If the shares of workers are equal, i.e., g1 = g2 = 1
2 we can ﬁnd an



















The last inequality is satisﬁed if general equilibrium eﬀects are very important (low σ), if there
is less inequality (higher α), and if tax elasticities of earnings are higher for high-skilled workers
than for low-skilled workers (large (εzt
1 − εzt
2 )/(1 − β)). Subsidizing work eﬀort provokes such
strong general equilibrium eﬀects that low-ability workers are better oﬀ by paying subsidies to
the high-ability workers: their before tax wages increase more than is needed to oﬀset the rise
in lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance the subsidies on work.
Optimal negative income taxes may not be a purely theoretical curiosity. As an illustrative
example, suppose that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers equals
σ = 1.5, which is not an uncommon empirical value (see for example Katz and Autor, 1999).
Assume furthermore that the skilled worker earns 50% more than the unskilled worker so that
α = 0.4. This can be justiﬁed by a wage increase of 10% for every additional year of schooling
and 5 years of higher education. A Mincer return of 10% is not an uncommon empirical estimate
either (see Card, 1999). α = 0.4 may also correspond to the income share of low-skilled workers in
labor earnings. Finally, take β to be 1/4. This can be interpreted as the share of forgone earnings
in life-time earnings, or the share of schooling years in total years available for working and
education. Then, the diﬀerence in human capital supply elasticities must satisfy εzt
1 −εzt
2 = 0.24.
Under this parameterization, a diﬀerence of 0.24 in the total elasticity of labor earnings is
suﬃcient to have negative optimal marginal tax rates, when general equilibrium eﬀects on wages
are present.
It should be noted that uncompensated elasticities determine the general equilibrium impact
of taxes. The change in relative supplies determines the eﬀect on wages. This change in relative
supply is correctly measured only with uncompensated, and not compensated, changes.14
constitutes a smaller part of total income for wealthier individuals, and
∂(ln/1−ln)
∂n > 0. The latter can be proven










(wn−wnln)2 > 0. This term is positive under
standard monotonicity (or ‘single-crossing’) conditions, which ensure that gross incomes (and consumption) in-





∂n > 0, see Mirrlees (1971). Allowing for human capital formation
does not qualitatively aﬀect this derivation.
13Using identical utility functions, Allen (1982) found that general equilibrium eﬀects may result in both lower
and higher optimal linear income tax rates compared to the case with exogenous wages. Higher optimal linear
taxes can be found if income eﬀects in labor supply are suﬃciently strong. Even when skilled and unskilled
workers have identical preferences, income eﬀects can drive the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply
of skilled workers below the uncompensated labor supply elasticity of unskilled workers, and general equilibrium
eﬀects work in favor of redistribution.
14The current model ignores income eﬀects, and compensated and uncompensated elasticities coincide.
Whether this is an omission remains an open empirical question. Estimates of the income elasticity of labor
supply vary substantially, and there appears to be no consensus in the literature on its size, see also Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999), and Gruber and Saez (2003).
122.6 Optimal education policies in general equilibrium
This section analyzes the case where the government has only education subsidies at its disposal
and does not have access to an income tax (t = 0). This is not the relevant case to describe the
real world, but it helps to derive the intuition for the results in the next section, where both
tax and education policies are simultaneously optimized. Again, ﬁrst education subsidies in the











where ¯ εes ≡ (1 − α)εes






µn). Since the optimal subsidy is negative, education is taxed if the
government has no other means to redistribute incomes. The formula again stresses the trade-
oﬀ between equity (numerator) and eﬃciency (denominator). The more education taxes yield
distributional gains (larger ξ), the larger are taxes on education. If education decisions are more
elastic to taxes, ¯ εes increases and optimal taxes on education are lower as a consequence.



























The diﬀerence with the optimal subsidy without general equilibrium eﬀects (25) is again a term














σ. The intuition of the optimal income tax carries over to the present case. If wage elasticities
of labor supply are equal (ε1 = ε2, so that µ1 = µ2) education subsidies will not provoke general
equilibrium eﬀects since relative supplies of human capital are not aﬀected. Similarly, perfect
substitution between labor types (σ = ∞) gives the same result as the expression without general
equilibrium eﬀects.
Taxes on human capital formation are lower if imperfect substitution on the labor market
is important (low σ), and if the labor supply elasticity of the high-ability worker is lower than
that of the low-ability worker, i.e., ε1 > ε2. The latter condition is necessary to have education
subsidies working in favor of redistribution through general equilibrium eﬀects. Indeed, one may
get the result that – even in the absence of an income tax – education should be subsidized
for distributional reasons if the adverse distributional eﬀects ξ are outweighed by the positive









2α(1−α). We can infer that with σ = 1.5 and α = 0.4, a diﬀerence
in subsidy elasticities of education equal to 0.31 is suﬃcient to provoke such strong general
equilibrium eﬀects that education should be subsidized rather than taxed.
2.7 Optimal tax and education policies in general equilibrium
When the government simultaneously optimizes tax and education policies, the optimal taxes
and subsidies follow from solving the ﬁrst-order conditions for t and s. The general solution for
optimal education subsidies in the presence of general equilibrium eﬀects is (see Appendix)
s = 0. (27)
The government sets the subsidies on education to zero. Therefore, educational investments
are weakly eﬃcient, i.e., conditional upon distorted labor supply, in the presence of an opti-
mal income tax. The intuition is the same as in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and
13Bovenberg (2007). The government may use education subsidies as an implicit tax on leisure,
because education and work eﬀort are complementary. At the same time, educational invest-
ments generate inequality due to the ability bias in education, i.e., the high-ability individuals
invest more in education than low-ability individuals (ceteris paribus).
The constant elasticity in the human capital production function ensures that there is a linear
relation between en and zn. Hence, subsidizing en is equivalent to subsidizing zn. Education
subsidies do not reduce the labor supply distortion more compared to an equally costly reduction
in income taxes. However, besides distorting labor supply, subsidies on education also distort
human capital investment. This distortion in education (over-investment) can be avoided by not
subsidizing education. Therefore, the government does not want to use education subsidies to
reduce the tax wedge on labor supply (Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2007).
The government is also indiﬀerent between education taxes and income taxes to redistribute
income. Because education is linear in income, any redistribution that education taxes can
achieve, can be achieved equally as well with income taxes. Indeed, the distributional character-
istics of income (ξz) and education (ξe) are equal. While both taxes on income and education
reduce labor eﬀort, taxing education en additionally causes under-investment in human capital.
The income tax does not directly distort human capital investment, because costs and beneﬁts
of education are equally aﬀected by the marginal tax rate. The government can therefore avoid
distortions in human capital accumulation by using the income tax instead of taxes on education
to redistribute incomes (Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2007).
General equilibrium eﬀects do not change the logic of these arguments. Even when general
equilibrium eﬀects on wages are present, there is still a linear relationship between earnings
and education. Hence, education subsidies remain distributionally equivalent to income taxes,
and education subsidies still cannot be used as implicit taxes on leisure. Optimal subsidies
thus ensure conditional eﬃciency in human capital formation. We like to speak of conditional
eﬃciency, because labor supply is still distorted below ﬁrst-best levels. As the utilization rate of
human capital is lower, so are the returns to human capital investments, and education is below
ﬁrst-best levels.
From this discussion follows that education subsidies should not be employed to compress the
wage distribution in the optimal redistributive program. This proves the robustness of Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005) in the presence of general equilibrium eﬀects on wages. The optimal linear
income tax with optimal education policies remains as in (27). Hence, the reader is referred to
the earlier discussion.
3 Non-linear taxes and subsidies
This section derives the optimal non-linear tax and education policies. We can now allow for
general utility and production functions. We do nevertheless maintain the assumption that the
earnings function is weakly separable in ability, labor, and education. This ensures that optimal
education subsidies are zero in the absence of general equilibrium eﬀects on wages (Jacobs and
Bovenberg, 2007). We also provide simulations of the optimal non-linear taxes and subsidies,
while maintaining the same structure on preferences and technologies as in the linear case.
The optimal non-linear tax and subsidy rates are found by deriving the optimal second-best
allocation of consumption, gross income and education, as in Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982).
By using the ﬁrst-order conditions for individual optimization, we can compute the optimal
marginal income taxes and optimal marginal education subsidies that would decentralize the
optimal second-best allocation.
Any solution to the optimal second-best problem has to satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraints stating that each individual has a weakly higher utility choosing the bundle (cn,zn,en)
of consumption, gross income and education, which is intended for them, than utility of choosing
14the alternative bundle of (cm,zm,em), which is intended for the other. That is,
Un(cn,zn,en,n) ≥ Un(cm,zm,em,n), n,m = 1,2, (28)





= un (cn,ln). In the current model, the two incentive
compatibility constraints are given by








































The government maximizes the social welfare function (12) subject to the economy’s resource
constraint (11), and incentive compatibility constraint (29). Under normal circumstances, the
second-incentive constraint (30) is not binding at an optimal solution, and it will be ignored in
the remainder (see also Stiglitz, 1982, and Stern, 1982). Assuming for simplicity that the price
of a unit of education is one, and the number of high-ability and low-ability persons are both
equal to one, the following Lagrangian for the maximization of social welfare is formulated15
max
{c1,l1,e1,c2,l2,e2}
L = ω1u1(c1,l1) + ω2u2(c2,l2) (31)
+η (F(a1φ(e1)l1,a2φ(e2)l2) − e1 − e2 − c1 − c2 − Λ)
+θ
















where the inverse of the skill premium is denoted by π−1, see (9). The conditions for labor
market equilibrium (10) are substituted. To avoid confusion in notation, utility of the high-







. θ is the
Lagrange multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint, and measures the marginal social
value of redistributing income from the high-skilled to the low-skilled worker.


















































































15Allowing for pn to diﬀer between individuals does not aﬀect the results. The extension with diﬀerent fractions
gn of both types is trivial.





















Consequently, the marginal top rate is exploited for redistribution with general equilibrium
eﬀects on wages. Indeed, the general expression of the optimal marginal tax on the skilled type
is almost identical to the one without human capital formation, see Stern (1982) and Stiglitz
(1982). The basic intuition of these papers carries over to the present case. A marginal subsidy
on work for the high-ability type increases relative supply of skilled human capital, and lowers
the skill premium π. Hence, the utility costs of mimicking the low-ability type increase, as it
takes the skilled type more labor time to mimic the unskilled type. In the absence of general
equilibrium eﬀects on wages (σ = ∞), there is no distortion at the top, and the marginal tax rate
is zero, see also Seade (1977) and Mirrlees (1971). Further, if the government is not interested in
redistribution, the marginal social value of transferring incomes from high-ability to low-ability
workers, θ, is zero, and optimal marginal taxes are zero as well.
Manipulation of the ﬁrst-order condition for c2 (35) and the ﬁrst-order condition for l2 (36)
yields the marginal tax on labor of the low-ability type T 0





















(σ − 1). (39)
In the absence of general equilibrium eﬀects, the marginal tax rate on the low-ability type is
unambiguously positive, since the top rate is zero (T 0
1 = 0) in that case (see Mirrlees, 1971;
Stiglitz, 1982). The presence of general equilibrium eﬀects (lower σ) increases the marginal
tax rate T
0
2 on the low type (recall T 0
1 < 0). This is intuitive, since a higher marginal tax
rate on the low type reduces their labor supply, and therefore results in more before-tax wage
equality. Hence, the high type is less tempted to mimic the low type, which relaxes the incentive
compatibility constraint, and therefore results in more redistribution.
Optimal education subsidies for the high type are derived from combining the ﬁrst-order
conditions for e1 (34) with the optimal marginal income tax for skilled workers (38). Then, we
ﬁnd that the optimal marginal education subsidy for high-ability workers S0
1 ≡ 1 − w1a1φ0(e1)l1



















1 > 0. (40)
The intuition is that a marginal subsidy on human capital investment of the high type (like the
marginal subsidy on work) lowers the skill premium, and makes it more costly for the high-ability
type to mimic the low-ability type.
Similarly, we ﬁnd the optimal subsidy on education for the low-ability type S0
2 ≡ 1 −






















1 < 0. (41)
Therefore, education is taxed on the margin for the low-ability type. Again, the mechanism is
that general equilibrium eﬀects relax the incentive compatibility constraint, and the government
can redistribute more income.
16With only two types the tax schedule is not continuous and generally not diﬀerentiable. As such, one cannot
equate 1 + 1
a1φ(e1)F1
∂u1/∂l1
∂u1/∂c1 with the derivative of a tax schedule T(z1) at income point z1.
16Note that the expressions for the marginal education subsidies are all directly related to
the top rate. Indeed, subsidies or taxes on education are larger if the top rate is lower, i.e.,
when general equilibrium eﬀects are more important (lower σ), and if the government wishes
to redistribute incomes more heavily (larger θ). If labor types are perfect substitutes (σ = ∞),
the optimal marginal education subsidies for both high and low-skilled workers are zero, i.e.,
S0
1 = S0
2 = 0, cf. Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).
General equilibrium eﬀects on the skill-premium should indeed be exploited for redistribution
under non-linear policies, in contrast to optimal linear policies. The intuition is that, by using
non-linear instruments, the government can directly inﬂuence the skill premium π (H1/H2), by
setting diﬀerent marginal tax and subsidy rates for each worker, as long as the policy remains
incentive compatible. This holds true irrespective of preferences or technologies. Hence, by
optimally giving marginal subsidies on the high-ability type and marginal taxes on the low-
ability type, the skill premium falls, the incentive compatibility constraint is relaxed, and the
policy achieves more income redistribution.
The ‘tax-formula result’ of Saez (2004) is not applicable either with non-linear policy instru-
ments, as the production elasticity (i.e., σ) enters optimal tax expressions. Further, indirect
taxes/subsidies, such as education subsidies, are not optimally zero under non-linear income
taxation with weakly separable preferences. This bolsters the ﬁndings by Naito (1999, 2004,
2007), who investigated the desirability of non-zero commodity taxes in similar general equilib-
rium settings with human capital formation, and comparative advantage. In the current model,
education should optimally be taxed or subsidized under non-linear income taxation to exploit
factor price changes for redistribution, and the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem does not
apply to education subsidies. In the absence of general equilibrium eﬀects, education would not
be taxed or subsidized on a net basis, and would be weakly eﬃcient, i.e., eﬃcient conditional
upon distorted labor supply.
To check whether general equilibrium eﬀects can be quantitatively important for optimal
non-linear tax and education policies, we simulate the model following Stern (1982). We resort
to the standard iso-elastic utility function with a constant wage elasticity of labor supply, which
is augmented with a preference parameter δ to calibrate the dis-utility of labor supply







, n = 1,2. (42)
In the baseline, we set the wage elasticities of labor supply equal for both types at ε1 = ε2 = 0.25.
The preference parameter for leisure is calibrated at δ = 10, so as to keep labor eﬀort of
both types between 0 and 1. The production function for human capital is Cobb-Douglas,
anφ(en) ≡ aneβ
n, with an elasticity β = 0.25. The ability parameters are set at a1 = 10 and
a2 = 5. Hence, the high-ability worker is twice as ‘smart’ as the low-ability worker. The
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The elasticity of substitution between high and low-skilled labor is set at σ = 1.5, see Katz and
Autor (1999). The share parameter is calibrated at γ = 0.59 to get an income share of skilled
labor in total output of 1 − α = 0.67 in the absence of government intervention (see also Stern,
1982). The baseline welfare weights in the social welfare function are ω1 = 1−ω2 = 0.25. Setting
ω1 = ω2 = 0.5 corresponds to an utilitarian criterion, which is non-redistributive because the
private marginal utility of income is unity. ω1 = 1 − ω2 = 0 corresponds to a Rawlsian social
welfare function. The simulation results are given in table 1.
Calculations by Stern (1982) in models without endogenous human capital formation reveal
that general equilibrium eﬀects have little impact on simulated optimum tax rates. We largely
17Table 1: Optimal non-linear tax and education policies
σ ∞ 5 2 1.5 0.99 0.75 0.6
γ 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.59 0.67 0.74 0.82
T
0
1 0.0% 0.0% -1.5% -2.3% -4.6% -8.4% -8.8%
T
0
2 30.4% 33.0% 31.1% 31.7% 33.4% 36.1% 38.1%
S0
1 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 2.3% 4.4% 7.8% 8.1%
S
0
2 0.0% -0.1% -3.4% -5.2% -10.3% -19.5% -21.9%
ε1 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.1
T
0
1 -22.2% -16.1% -9.4% -2.3% -0.1%
T
0
2 19.0% 22.7% 27.0% 31.7% 33.3%
S0
1 18.2% 13.9% 8.6% 2.3% 0.1%
S
0
2 -75.2% -46.6% -23.4% -5.2% -0.1%
ε2 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.1
T
0
1 -0.6% -0.9% -1.4% -2.3% -3.3%
T
0
2 32.7% 32.5% 32.2% 31.7% 31.2%
S0
1 0.6% 0.9% 1.4% 2.3% 3.2%
S
0
2 -1.9% -2.5% -3.5% -5.2% -6.8%
β 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4
T
0
1 -1.5% -2.0% -2.3% -2.8% -4.1%
T
0
2 32.3% 32.0% 31.7% 31.4% 30.3%
S0
1 1.5% 2.0% 2.3% 2.7% 4.0%
S
0
2 -3.2% -4.3% -5.2% -6.3% -10.2%
ω1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
T
0
1 0.0% -0.9% -1.9% -2.8% -3.8% -4.7%
T
0
2 0.0% 15.9% 27.2% 35.7% 42.2% 47.4%
S0
1 0.0% 0.9% 1.8% 2.7% 3.6% 4.5%
S
0
2 0.0% -2.0% -4.1% -6.3% -8.7% -11.4%
Λ 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
T
0
1 -2.3% -2.3% -2.3% -2.3% -2.3% -2.3%
T
0
2 31.7% 31.7% 31.7% 31.7% 31.7% 31.7%
S0
1 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
S
0
2 -5.2% -5.2% -5.2% -5.2% -5.2% -5.2%







. The production function for human
capital is anφ(en) ≡ aneβ
n. Output is Y = (γH
ρ
1 + (1 − γ)H
ρ
2)
1/ρ, σ ≡ 1
1−ρ, Hn ≡ anφ(en)ln.
And, social welfare is ω1u1 + ω2u2. The baseline parameters are: ε1 = ε2 = 0.25, δ = 10,
β = 0.25, a1 = 10, a2 = 5, σ = 1.5, γ = 0.59, ω1 = 1 − ω2 = 0.25.
18conﬁrm this. The the top-rate is indeed only slightly negative, even with endogenous learning.
Since the expressions for optimal education subsidies are all directly related to the top-rate, we
see that the general equilibrium impact on optimum non-linear subsidies is rather limited as
well.
As expected, the optimal tax expressions are most sensitive to changes in the elasticity of
substitution σ. For diﬀerent elasticities σ, we calibrate the parameter γ so as to keep the income
share of skilled labor ﬁxed at 1 − α = 0.67 in the absence of government intervention.17 We
ﬁnd that marginal education subsidies and taxes are substantially diﬀering from zero when the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor falls below unity, which is empirically
less plausible.
Further, the elasticity of high-ability labor supply ε1 is important in explaining the pattern of
marginal taxes and subsidies. It is a crucial determinant of the incentive compatibility constraint.
The higher this elasticity, the more diﬃcult it is for the high type to mimic the low type, and the
larger are marginal subsidies on high-ability labor supply and education. From the table follows
that the main results are not driven by the labor supply elasticity of the low type, nor by the
human capital elasticity, the social welfare function, or the government revenue requirement.
4 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the simultaneous setting of optimal linear and non-linear income taxes and
education subsidies in two-type models with endogenous labor supply, endogenous human capital
formation, and endogenous wage rates. To investigate the potential role of general equilibrium
eﬀects in shaping optimal linear tax and education policies, we ensured that optimal subsidies on
education are zero in the absence of general equilibrium eﬀects on wages. This required weakly
separable earnings functions, and, for linear instruments only, a constant elasticity in the human
capital production function. For linear education subsidies to work in favor of redistribution, we
further assumed that labor supply of the high-ability (‘skilled’) type is more elastic than labor
supply of the low-ability (‘unskilled’) type. Linear taxes and subsidies cannot – by assumption
– aﬀect the skill premium if all elasticities are equal.
We showed that optimal linear education subsidies are zero, even if linear tax and education
policies have the potential to provoke equilibrium eﬀects on wage rates. The intuition is that
linear income taxes are distributionally equivalent to (negative) linear education subsidies, and
more eﬃcient because income taxes do not generate distortions in human capital formation,
whereas linear subsidies cause over-investment. This holds true whether general equilibrium
eﬀects are present or not. The optimal linear income tax is, however, lowered due to general
equilibrium eﬀects on wages if skilled labor supply is more elastic than unskilled labor supply.
A higher income tax increases the skill premium, because skilled labor supply falls more than
unskilled labor supply. These general equilibrium eﬀects work against the direct redistributional
gains of a higher income tax rate. The optimal linear income tax rate may even turn negative
when general equilibrium eﬀects on wages are suﬃciently strong.
The results for optimal non-linear policies are found to be fundamentally diﬀerent. With
non-linear instruments, the government can directly aﬀect the relative supply of skilled human
capital using speciﬁc instruments, such as marginal subsidies on human capital or labor supply
of the high type, and marginal taxes on human capital or labor supply of the low type. Con-
sequently, one does not need to impose restrictions on preferences or the production function
for human capital to obtain an impact of non-linear policies on the skill premium. The non-
linearity of tax and subsidy schedules is suﬃcient. Optimal non-linear policies do exploit general
equilibrium eﬀects on wages for redistributional purposes. The skilled worker optimally faces
17Otherwise, the condition that skilled labor income is always higher than unskilled labor income (w1H1 >
w2H2) may be violated, and the maximization problem will become misspeciﬁed.
19marginal subsidies on both work eﬀort and education, whereas the unskilled worker optimally
faces marginal taxes on work and education. As a result, wage diﬀerences are reduced, and the
incentive compatibility constraint is relaxed, because the skilled worker ﬁnds it harder to mimic
an unskilled worker. However, simulations of optimal non-linear policies revealed that the impact
of general equilibrium eﬀects on optimal policies is modest. Only at low levels of the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, marginal subsidies (taxes) on skilled (unskilled)
education, and marginal subsidies on skilled work are found to be substantially positive.
In future research, the current analysis can be cast in a model with two production sec-
tors, each exhibiting diﬀerent factor intensities, so as to investigate the desirability of aggregate
production eﬃciency, and the optimality of zero commodity taxation. Our conjecture is that
deviations from aggregate production eﬃciency, and non-zero commodity will be optimal, as
Naito (1999, 2004, 2007) has demonstrated in similar settings, but without education policies.
However, it remains unclear how optimal education policies will be aﬀected. The current two-
type analysis of non-linear income taxation may also be extended to a setting with a continuum
of skill-types in order to further investigate how factor prices should be exploited for redistribu-
tion under non-linear income taxation with more realistic skill distributions as in for example
Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). Nevertheless, the expressions for the incentive compatibility
constraints reveal that each of them is dependent on the entire wage distribution, and therefore
on all the actions of all other agents. As a consequence, the set of incentive compatibility con-
straints cannot easily be collapsed into a single diﬀerential equation on utility, as in Mirrlees
(1971), and one needs to resort to numerical simulations. Our results under linear income tax-
ation will also change when more general utility or earnings functions are used to analyze the
importance of income eﬀects, and to allow for the possibility that education has a varying degree
of complementarity with work eﬀort (see Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2007). Also, extensions with
imperfections in labor markets due to for example minimum wages, search frictions, unions, and
eﬃciency wages may be interesting avenues for future research.
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Appendix
Second-order conditions of individual optimization
By substituting the household budget constraint (3) into the utility function (1) to eliminate cn,
we arrive at the following unconstrained maximization problem
max
{ln,en}






The ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂Un
∂ln
= (1 − t)wnanφ(en) − l
1/εn
n = 0, (45)
∂Un
∂en
= (1 − t)(wnanφ
0(en)ln − (1 − s)pn) = 0. (46)






n (1 − t)wnanφ0(en)
(1 − t)wnanφ0(en) (1 − t)wnanlnφ00(en)

. (47)
For utility to reach a maximum, the Hessian matrix should be negative deﬁnite. This is the
case if the leading principal minors of H switch signs. The ﬁrst principal minor is negative.





2 > 0. Using (4) to eliminate ln and substituting (2), this inequality can be
written as
µn ≡ 1 − β(1 + εn) > 0. (48)
Elasticities of individual behavior
Log-linearizing (5) (using φ(en) = eβ
n) gives
˜ ln + (β − 1)˜ en = −˜ s. (49)
A tilde stands for a relative change (i.e., ˜ ln ≡ dln/ln, ˜ en ≡ den/en, et cetera), except for the tax
rate and the subsidy rates, where ˜ t ≡ dt/(1 − t), and ˜ s ≡ ds/(1 − s).
22Expression (4) implies that labor supply depends only on the after-tax wage rate (1 −
t)wnanφ(en) so that
˜ ln = εn(β˜ en − ˜ t). (50)






























































Optimal linear income taxation
The ﬁrst-order condition for the linear income tax can be rewritten by substituting wnanφ(en)ln−
pn(1 − s)en = (1 − β)zn, and pnen =
β







ωn(1 − β)zngn + η
X
n































































Next, use the distributional characteristic (16), divide by average income ¯ z = F(.), and η. Use
the property that the labor demand functions are homogenous of degree zero. Substitution of





































n zngn = (1−α)εlt
1+αεlt
2,





n zngn = (1−α)εet
1 +αεet









µn. Use 1 − α ≡
H1F1
F , α ≡
H2F2
F , and 1
σ ≡
F12F
F1F2, and simplify to obtain


























To ﬁnd the optimal linear income without education subsidies, set s = 0. Rearranging yields
the expression in the main text.
23Optimal education subsidies
The ﬁrst order condition for s can be rewritten by rearranging, and substituting pnen =
β
1−szn




































































































¯ z and use ¯ z = F(.). Apply
the property that the labor demand functions are homogenous of degree zero. Substitution of







































n zngn = (1 − α)εls
1 +
αεls





n zngn = (1 − α)εes
1 + αεes
2 . Also the elasticity of skilled and













































By setting t = 0, the equation of optimal subsidies in the text is obtained.
Optimal tax and education policies

















































































































β = 0. Therefore, s
(1−s)(1−t) = 0. The optimal income tax follows from






µ2in the expression for the optimal income tax.
24Optimal non-linear tax policies
The optimal marginal tax rate on the high-ability type follows from multiplying the ﬁrst-order
condition for c1 (32) by
∂u1/∂l1
∂u1/∂c1, and substituting the result in (33). Rearranging while using the
deﬁnition for T 0























































where the property is used that the labor demand function is homogeneous of degree zero (21).
Substitution of the last result yields the equation in the text.
Repeating the same procedure with the ﬁrst-order conditions for c2 (35) and for l2 (36) yields
the marginal tax on unskilled labor income T 0

































∂l2 can be written as π−1 + H2
∂π−1

























































(σ − 1). (70)
Rearranging yields the expression in the text.
Optimal non-linear education policies
Optimal education subsidies for the skilled worker follow from combining the expression of the
optimal income tax (38) with the ﬁrst-order condition for e1 (34). First, rewrite the ﬁrst-

















Dividing this by the expression for the optimal income tax gives the expression in the text.
Similarly we ﬁnd the optimal subsidy on education for the unskilled worker. Rewrite the
ﬁrst-order condition for e2 using S
0















Using the properties of the production function and substituting 1−S
0























Dividing the last equation by (1 − S0










equation in the text.
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